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Class Actions
Thomas M. Byrne*
Stacey McGavin Mohr**
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 2021
class-action work featured an important decision on the existence of an
independent ascertainability requirement for class certification. In an
abrupt reversal of two unpublished opinions acknowledging the
existence of such a requirement, the court aligned itself with most
circuits that have addressed the question in demoting the
ascertainability of class membership to a factor to be considered in
establishing the manageability of a class action, rather than an
independent requirement. The court’s other significant cases concerned
class settlements and standing.1
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
A. Administrative Feasibility: Cherry v. Dometic Corp.
The Eleventh Circuit joined with the majority of circuits in holding
that a threshold determination that identifying class members is
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administratively feasible is not a separate requirement for class
certification. The ruling, in the closely watched case of Cherry v.
Dometic Corporation,2 which attracted numerous amicus briefs,
represents a minor victory for the plaintiffs’ class-action bar. The issue
before the court was framed in terms of the “ascertainability”
requirement for membership in a class action.3 The specific issue was
whether the ascertainability requirement means not only that the
members of a class are capable of being determined, but also that class
membership can be determined without extensive factual inquiry.4 In
an opinion by Chief Judge William Pryor, the court held that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 235 imposed no such heightened administrative
feasibility requirement but that administrative feasibility may be
considered in weighing the manageability criterion for Rule 23(b)(3)
classes.6 In so holding, the court rejected the unpublished opinions of
two Eleventh Circuit panels that had held to the contrary, Karhu v.
Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc.7 and Bussey v. Macon County Greyhound
Park, Inc.8
The court’s opinion tracks the reasoning of the leading opinion,
rejecting the heightened ascertainability requirement, Mullins v. Direct
Digital, LLC,9 which forcefully counters the leading opinion to the
contrary in Carrera v. Bayer Corp.10 The court in Cherry, however,
based its reasoning primarily on the text of Rule 23, while the Mullins
court proceeded from the broader policymaking premise that certifying
small-dollar class actions is a public good, a form of remedy for
wrongdoing that may be imposed before any wrongdoing has actually
been proven in accord with due process.11
Like the Mullins court, the court in Cherry posited that a class must
be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable, based on objective

2. 986 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2021). Chief Judge William Pryor authored the opinion
for the court.
3. Id. at 1300.
4. Id.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
6. Cherry, 986 F.3d at 1304–05.
7. 621 F. App’x 945 (11th Cir. 2015). For our analysis of the court’s opinion, see
Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin Mohr, Class Actions, 67 MERCER L. REV. 841, 849–
53 (2016).
8. 562 F. App’x 782 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin
Mohr, Class Actions, 66 MERCER L. REV. 903, 916–18 (2015).
9. 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015).
10. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
11. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658.
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criteria.12 No court disagrees. Like Mullins, Cherry rejects any
additional requirement that class membership be determinable without
extensive individual factual inquiry.13 Both courts hold that
administrative feasibility may be considered in determining whether a
proposed class action is superior to other available methods of
adjudication, but assume that the problems in identifying class
members would not be relevant to determinations of commonality (as
reinvigorated by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes14) or typicality, under
Rule 23(a).15 Additionally, like Mullins, Cherry appears to give short
shrift to class members’ core due-process rights to notice and
opportunity to opt out of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action.16 If class
members cannot be identified, then adequate notice to them is obviously
problematic. The court in Cherry also seems to overestimate the rigor
(or lack thereof) with which the superiority requirement has been
applied historically in district courts.
Administrative infeasibility, of course, would be relevant as well to
Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate over
individual issues, but that is not directly addressed in the court’s
opinion.
The district court in Cherry had refused to certify a Rule 23(b)(3)
product liability class involving claims that the defendant’s
refrigerators had a defect that posed a fire risk.17 The proposed class
consisted of all persons who had purchased the products in selected
states since 1997. The district court agreed with the defendant that the
plaintiffs failed to show that their proposed method of the identification
of class members would be workable. The court then dismissed the case
on erroneous jurisdictional grounds, based on the denial of class
certification, which does not divest a district court of subject-matter
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).18 The
Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.19

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Cherry, 986 F.3d at 1299.
Id. at 1304–05.
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
Cherry, 986 F.3d at 1303.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1299–1301.
Id. at 1300; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711–1715 (2005).
Cherry, 986 F.3d at 1305.
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The Eleventh Circuit joined the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits in rejecting heightened ascertainability.20 The First,
Third and Fourth Circuits have adopted the requirement.21 The deep
circuit split seems overdue to be resolved by the Supreme Court of the
United States. In 2021, the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to
consider the application of Rule 23’s certification requirements to
putative classes with unidentifiable class members. In TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez,22 the Court did not reach the question of whether
Rule 23(a)’s typicality requirement was met where few members of the
putative class shared the named plaintiff’s alleged injury. The Court
instead ruled that the majority of class members did not have Article III
standing and remanded for consideration of the propriety of
certification on that basis.23
B. Adequacy of Class Representative: Huang v. Equifax Inc. (In re
Equifax Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation)
Huang v. Equifax Inc. (In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Security
Breach Litigation)24 upheld the district court’s approval of a class
settlement arising out of the Equifax data breach—except for the
incentive awards to the class representatives, as to which the court
reversed the district court in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020
decision in Johnson v. NPAS Solutions, LLC.25
The settlement in question arose from “scores of class actions” filed in
the wake of a 2017 data breach affecting Equifax and its affiliates.26
The cases were consolidated in the United States District Court for the

20. In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 862 F.3d 250, 267 (2d Cir. 2017); Rikos v. P&G, 799
F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015); Mullins, 795 F.3d at 662; Sandusky Wellness Ctr. v.
MedTox Sci., 821 F.3d 992, 995–96 (8th Cir. 2016); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, 844 F.3d
1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2017).
21. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015); Carrera, 727 F.3d at
307–08; EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358–59 (4th Cir. 2014).
22. 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
23. Id. at 2214.
24. 999 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2021). The opinion for the court was authored by
Judge Beverly Martin.
25. 975 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020). In NPAS Solutions, the court held that federal
law prohibits such incentive payments to class representatives, even when part of an
agreed settlement. A petition for rehearing en banc has been filed, supported by several
amicus briefs. The court has not yet ruled on the petition but meanwhile has withheld
issuance of the mandate. Order, Johnson v. NPA Sols., LLC, No. 18-12344 (11th Cir. Nov.
9, 2020). For further discussion of NPAS Solutions and its impact, see Byrne & Mohr,
supra note 1, at 1050–52.
26. In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d at 1256.
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Northern District of Georgia, and the consolidated complaint filed on
behalf of consumers included claims under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA) and various state consumer-protection and data-breach
statutes, as well as claims for negligence and negligence per se. The
settlement—which followed eighteen months of negotiations between
the parties and with various state and federal regulators, as well as
mediation before a retired federal judge—bound approximately 147
million class members and provided for reimbursement for documented
out-of-pocket losses; compensation for up to twenty hours spent dealing
with either identity theft or taking preventative measures; free credit
monitoring and identity theft prevention services for ten years (with an
option for alternative cash consideration); and seven years of identity
restoration services. The settlement did not provide for any potential
reversion to Equifax and further required that Equifax spend at least
$1 billion on data security over five years.27
The settlement drew objections from 388 class members, six of whom
appealed following the district court’s approval of the settlement.28 In a
lengthy opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
approval of the settlement except with respect to the incentive awards
to the class representatives.29
First, citing its recent en banc decision in Muransky v. Godiva
Chocolatier, Inc.,30 the court rejected the argument that class members
who did not actually have their identities stolen lacked the injury-infact required to establish Article III standing.31 The court similarly
rejected the novel argument that the settlement of a class action ends
the Article III “controversy” to strip the court of jurisdiction.32
Second, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
requirement that each objector provide the objector’s name, address,
signature, grounds for objection, previous objections in class actions,
and potential deposition dates.33 The requirements “were not
particularly burdensome,” the court decided, and the district court had
imposed them for the stated purpose of “avoiding a ‘chaotic process.’”34
The court suggested that the sheer size of the class nudged these

27. Id. at 1256–60.
28. Id. at 1257.
29. Id. at 1284.
30. 979 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2020). For an analysis of Muransky, see our Article in last
year’s Survey. Byrne & Mohr, supra note 1, at 1056–60.
31. In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d at 1263.
32. Id. at 1264.
33. Id. at 1267.
34. Id. at 1266.
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measures, similar to some that have been criticized by other courts, into
the realm of the court’s discretion.35
Third, the court found no reversible error in the district court’s
adoption of an order “ghostwritten” by the plaintiffs’ counsel.36
“Ghostwriting” by litigants is generally disfavored, but the critical
question is “whether ‘the process by which the judge arrived at the
order was fundamentally unfair.’”37 Here, where the district court
announced its ruling in court and then asked the plaintiffs’ counsel to
submit an order in accordance with that ruling, which the district court
would “consider signing,” the process was not fundamentally unfair.38
Fourth, the court upheld the district court’s decision to approve the
settlement, finding that the district court properly applied the factors
set forth in Bennett v. Behring Corp.,39 to determine that the settlement
was fair, reasonable, and adequate.40
Fifth, the court rejected an objector’s claim that the settlement class
did not satisfy Rule 23’s adequacy requirement.41 The objector argued
that there was a fundamental intraclass conflict because some class
members had claims for state statutory damages and others did not.42
The court found this difference less than fundamental, especially in
light of the objector’s failure to show that the statutory damages were
actually valuable: In fact, the court noted, “[the objector] doesn’t cite a
single case in which a plaintiff recovered statutory damages under
either [relevant state] statute in a data breach case.”43
Sixth, the court affirmed the $77.5 million attorney’s fee award.44
The district court determined that the requested fee was just over 20%
of the $380.5 million settlement fund, applying the percentage method
described in Camden I Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Dunkle.45 The district court
also used “the lodestar method as a cross-check.”46 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected an objector’s argument that Perdue v. Kenny

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1269.
Id. (quoting In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 276 (11th Cir. 1987)).
In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d at 1269–70.
737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1984).
In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d at 1277–78.
Id. at 1273–74.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1278.
946 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1991).
In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d at 1278.
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A.,47 required that the district court use the lodestar rather than the
percentage method, noting that Perdue involved a fee-shifting statute.48
The holding from Camden I, still applies in common-fund cases: “The
Supreme Court has never categorically prohibited the percentage
method in common fund cases.”49 The court also rejected another
objector’s argument that the district court should have considered
“economies of scale” as part of its evaluation of the settlement, given the
size of the settlement fund (a “megafund,” as the objector called it): “We
decline to add an additional factor requiring the District Court to
expressly consider the economies of scale in a megafund case.”50
Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s imposition of a $2,000
appeal bond on each objector, holding that the district court’s imposition
of a bond requirement based on its determination under Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure Rule 751 that there was a “substantial risk” of
nonpayment was permissible.52
The only settlement term not approved by the Eleventh Circuit was
the incentive award provision, which the court held was prohibited by
NPAS Solutions.53 Notably, NPAS Solutions involved claims under a
federal statute, while the remaining claims in In re Equifax Inc.
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation at the time of settlement
were all state-law claims. Still, the In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data
Security Breach Litigation panel determined that “NPAS Solutions
binds us here.”54

47. 559 U.S. 542 (2010).
48. In re Equifax, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 999 F.3d at 1279.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1280.
51. FED. R. APP. P. 7
52. In re Equifax, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 999 F.3d at 1283–84.
53. NPAS Solutions, 975 F.3d at 1244.
54. In re Equifax, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 999 F.3d at 1282. In
light of NPAS Solutions, the distinction between federal and state-law claims has been
one of the bases on which district courts had approved settlements. See e.g., Roth v.
GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No. 16-cv-62942WPD, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23105, at *37 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 8, 2021) (affirming settlement with incentive award because “state law governs
the issue of Service Awards” and NPAS Solutions therefore “is inapplicable to this case”).
NPAS Solutions may yet be revisited by the court en banc.
The NPAS Solutions decision did nothing to diminish the court’s reputation as
one of the more class-settlement-friendly circuits. Probably the most significant class
settlement decision of 2021 came from the Ninth Circuit, in Briseno v. Henderson, 998
F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2021). Briseno vacated a district court’s approval of a class settlement
in which class counsel would have received seven times more money than the class
members. The settlement also featured an injunction that the court termed worthless,
and a provision that the agreed amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by the defendant
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C. Class Certification Discovery: Rensel v. Centra Tech
The court wasted no time in applying the court’s holding in Cherry.
In Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc.,55 the court vacated, as an abuse of
discretion, a Florida district court’s denial of class certification on the
ground of lack of administrative feasibility.56 The case was a putative
securities fraud action premised on a cryptocurrency offering by Centra
Tech, the co-founders of which wound up being charged with criminal
securities law violations. An investor subsequently brought an action
under the Securities Act of 1933,57 and eventually, with a co-lead
plaintiff, moved for certification of three subclasses of investors.58 The
plaintiffs proposed to identify class members using a spreadsheet cited
by the government during the criminal case. But the district court
found that means of identification to be inadequate under the thenprevailing Karhu holding, noting that the spreadsheet provided
information on only one of the subclasses and there was no assurance
that the prosecutors would grant the plaintiffs access to the
spreadsheet in the first place.59 In rejecting this reasoning, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the proposed subclasses “easily meet
the Cherry standard for ascertainability.”60 As for the two subclasses of
direct purchasers, membership in those classes could be determined in
part through the spreadsheet and, as the court theorized, could have
been determined from additional company records or through
“submission of claims forms verified by transaction records.”61 The court
conceded that the subclass of open market purchasers may have
presented some difficulty but held that the district court should have
made further inquiry into whether membership in that subclass was
capable of determination.62
The court also determined the abuse of discretion in the district
court’s alternative ground for denial of class certification was the failure

would revert to the defendant if not approved by the court. The court held that the district
court had failed to apply to Rule 23(e)(2) standard for approval of class settlements, which
was revised in 2018.
55. 2 F.4th 1359 (11th Cir. 2021). The court’s opinion was authored by Senior Judge
Stanley Marcus.
56. Id. at 1361.
57. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (1933).
58. Rensel, 2 F.4th at 1363.
59. Id. at 1364.
60. Id. at 1370.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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to timely move for it.63 Under that Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA),64 the filing of a motion to dismiss results in a stay of all
discovery. Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(c)(1)(A)’s
requirement that a class be certified “at an early practicable time,” the
district court found that the plaintiffs’ certification motion, filed
eighteen months after the initial complaint and six months after an
amended complaint, was untimely.65 The Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that “[d]istrict courts have broad discretion to control
their dockets and surely may deny class certification motions as
untimely, such as when unreasonable delay causes prejudice to the
opposing party.”66 But the court noted that for fifteen of the eighteen
months between the filing of the initial complaint and the filing of the
motion to certify, the PSLRA automatic stay rule prevented the
plaintiffs from conducting any discovery to support their motion for
class certification.67 On the facts of the case, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs “were entitled to conduct some discovery before moving for
class certification.”68 The district court also failed to set a deadline for
filing the class certification motion.69 The parties timely filed a
Rule 26(f) joint discovery plan and conference report, but the district
court did not enter a scheduling order, an omission which violated the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.70 The court
determined that the plaintiffs had every reason to believe that their
motion would be timely.71
D. Interlocutory Review Under Rule 23(f): Progressive v. Paris
In Progressive American Insurance Co. v. Paris,72 the court denied a
petition for interlocutory review under Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure filed by insurance companies seeking review of
certification of two classes of Florida insureds who claimed they were
denied full payment for their total loss claims under Florida law.73 After

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2010).
Rensel, 2 F.4th at 1367.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1368.
Id.
Id.
No. 20-90028-D, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 38552 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2021).
Id. at *2.
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noting that interlocutory review is disfavored, the court explained that
the insurers did not appear to argue that the most important criterion
for such review—that the certification ruling is the death knell on the
merits for either the plaintiff or the defendant—was present.74 The
insurers argued primarily that there was substantial weakness in the
orders, but the court determined that they had failed to show the sort of
weakness required for review before final judgment.75 The court also
noted that the stage of the litigation, after discovery had closed and
with summary judgment motions pending that were likely to be
dispositive, weighed against interlocutory review.76
II. INJURY AND ARTICLE III STANDING
A. Risk of Identity Theft as Injury: Tsao v. Captiva
In Tsao v. Captiva MVP Restaurant Partners, LLC,77 the Eleventh
Circuit took a stand on whether a substantial risk of identity theft,
fraud, and other future harm constitutes Article III standing in data
breach cases.78 Affirming the district court’s decision, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the plaintiff, Tsao, lacked Article III standing because
he could not demonstrate a substantial risk of identity theft and
because he cannot manufacture standing.79 The court dismissed the
case without prejudice.80
The facts of this case are straightforward. Defendant PDQ
Restaurant experienced a data breach on May 19, 2017, when a hacker
exploited the defendant’s point of sale system and gained access to
customers’ personal data, including credit and debit card information.81
The defendant posted a notice to customers that it was the target of a
cyber-attack, and that customers who patronized any PDQ location
between May 19, 2017, and April 20, 2018, might be affected.82 The
notice provided that the customers’ personal information that “may
have been accessed” included: cardholder names; credit card numbers;

74. Id. at *2–3.
75. Id. at *3–4.
76. Id. at *6.
77. 986 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2021). The court’s opinion was authored by Senior Judge
Gerald Tjoflat.
78. Id. at 1334–35.
79. Id. at 1337.
80. Id. at 1335.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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card expiration dates; and CVVs.83 The plaintiff patronized the
defendant’s restaurants at least two times in October 2017, using two
different credit cards. When plaintiff learned of the possible breach in
2018, he cancelled his cards.84
Less than two weeks after the defendant’s announcement of the
cyber-attack, the plaintiff filed a class action complaint listing various
injuries that PDQ customers allegedly suffered as a result of the
breach, including “theft of their personal financial information,
unauthorized charges on their debit and credit card accounts, and
ascertainable losses in the form of the loss of cash back or other
benefits.”85 The plaintiff further asserted that he and the class members
were
[P]laced at an imminent, immediate, and continuing increased risk of
harm from identity theft and identity fraud, requiring them to take
the time which they otherwise would have dedicated to other life
demands such as work and effort to mitigate the actual and potential
impact of the Data Breach on their lives.86

In response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff focused
on three types of injuries he allegedly suffered to mitigate a perceived
risk of future identity theft: lost cash back or reward points; lost time
he spent addressing the problems caused by the breach; and restricted
card access resulting from cancelling his credit cards.87 The plaintiff
argued that he possessed standing for two independent reasons: first,
he and the class were at an increased risk of identity theft; and, second,
he proactively took steps to mitigate this risk. The district court
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for lack of
standing, reasoning that he never once alleged that his credit cards
were used by a thief or that his identity was stolen, or that he or anyone
else ever actually suffered from the alleged misuse of customer credit
card information. The district court found that such conclusory
allegations of harm were speculative at best, and insufficient to satisfy
Article III standing.88
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with an overview of standing
case law.89 Quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,90 the court observed that for
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 1335–36.
Id. at 1335. (internal quotes omitted).
Id. at 1335–36.
Id. at 1336.
Id. at 1336–37.
Id. at 1337.
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a plaintiff to have Article III standing, it must have “(1) suffered an
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.”91 To establish injury in fact, the court noted that a plaintiff
must set forth allegations that “plausibly and clearly allege a concrete
injury.”92 The court distilled two legal principles relevant to plaintiff’s
claims.93
First, a plaintiff alleging a threat of harm does not have Article III
standing unless the hypothetical harm alleged is either “certainly
impending” or there is a “substantial risk” of such harm. Second, if
the hypothetical harm alleged is not “certainly impending,” or if
there is not a substantial risk of the harm, a plaintiff cannot conjure
standing by inflicting some direct harm on itself to mitigate a
perceived risk.94

The court acknowledged a circuit split regarding whether a plaintiff
may establish injury in fact based solely on the increased risk of
identity theft.95 As the court noted, “the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits have all recognized—at the pleading stage—that a plaintiff can
establish injury-in-fact based on the increased risk of identity theft.”96
The Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have declined to find
standing on that basis.97 The Eleventh Circuit ultimately sided with the
Eighth Circuit’s holding in Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc.,98 which found
no standing based on an “increased risk of future identity theft” theory,
even where the plaintiff alleges actual misuse of personal information.99
The SuperValu court was influenced by a June 2007 United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report,100 which pointed out
that compromised credit or debit card information, without personal
identifying information, “generally cannot be used alone to open
unauthorized new accounts.”101

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

578 U.S. 330 (2016).
Id. at 338.
Tsao, 986 F.3d at 1337.
Id. at 1339.
Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 416 (2012)).
Id. at 1340.
Id.
Id.
870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017).
Tsao, 986 F.3d at 1342 (quoting SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 769).
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-07-737, Personal Information (2007).
Tsao, 986 F.3d at 1342 (quoting GAO report at page 30).
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The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, like the plaintiffs in SuperValu,
Plaintiff Tsao alleged that hackers may have accessed and stolen credit
card data.102 And, although Tsao also cited the June 2007 GAO report,
the court agreed with the Eighth Circuit that the report actually shows
that there was no substantial risk of identity theft.103 Plaintiff Tsao did
not allege that social security numbers, birth dates, or driver’s license
numbers were compromised in the cyber-attack on PDQ.104 The card
information allegedly accessed by the PDQ hackers, therefore, could not
be used alone to open a new account.105 The plaintiff’s conclusory
allegations of increased identity-theft risk were not enough to confer
standing, especially here, where the plaintiff effectively eliminated the
risk of potential future fraud by immediately cancelling his cards.106
Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff’s claims of actual,
present injuries in his efforts to mitigate any risk of identity theft were
insufficient to establish standing.107 The plaintiff alleged that the cyberattack required him to mitigate the harm, which resulted in three
separate injuries: (1) lost opportunity to accrue cash back or rewards
points on his cancelled cards; (2) costs associated with detection and
prevention of identity theft and the lost time associated with cancelling
his cards; and (3) restricted account access to preferred cards.108 But the
court concluded that these mitigation costs were voluntary and
“inextricably tied to his perception of the actual risk of identity theft.”109
Because a plaintiff cannot manufacture standing by inflicting harm on
himself in the face of hypothetical fear, the court again affirmed the
district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish
standing.110
B. Standing for Declaratory Relief: Mack v. USAA
In Mack v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co.,111 the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed for lack of an Article III “case or controversy,” a putative
class action in which the plaintiff sought a declaration that his insurer’s

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
court.

Id. at 1343.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
Id. at 1344–45.
Id. at 1345.
994 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021). Judge Andrew Brasher wrote the opinion for the
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adjustment of total loss claims violates Florida law and money damages
as corresponding “supplemental relief.”112
Leroy Mack brought an action against USAA in Florida state court
following adjustment of his insurance claim for a totaled vehicle,
seeking a declaration that the methodology USAA used to adjust his
claim violated Florida law; a declaration that USAA was required to
pay dealer fees as part of its settlement of the claim; and damages for
unpaid title and license fees.113 USAA removed the case, and the
district court stayed the case pending appraisal under the terms of the
insurance policy. Mack appealed that decision, and while the appeal
was pending, the parties settled the claim for money damages. After
that, the Eleventh Circuit requested supplemental briefing addressing
whether Mack had Article III standing to pursue his remaining claims
in federal court.114
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.115 USAA, having invoked federal jurisdiction by removing
the case, had the burden to establish the existence of a cognizable “case
or controversy.”116 The court “easily dispense[d] with the possibility that
Mack has standing for prospective relief,” because his allegation that he
and other class members “could reasonably anticipate suffering another
total loss in the future” fell short of establishing a “‘substantial
likelihood’ of future injury.”117
Turning to the question of standing to seek retrospective relief, the
court held that Mack had not sought any such relief:
We will not construe Mack’s declaratory judgment claims as claims
for retrospective relief for the purpose of assessing his standing . . . .
Mack chose to frame his claims as seeking prospective relief through
requests for declaratory judgments; he specifically chose not to
pursue damages for the retrospective harm that he has also arguably
alleged.118

This was unchanged by the fact that Mack would seek money
damages as supplemental relief if his requested declaration were
entered: “[T]he possibility of supplemental relief does not convert
112. Id. at 1354.
113. Id. at 1355.
114. Id. at 1355–56.
115. Id. at 1359.
116. Id. at 1358.
117. Id. at 1357 (quoting A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. GEICO General Ins. Co.,
925 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2019)).
118. Mack, 994 F.3d at 1357.
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Mack’s declaratory judgment claims into an effort to remedy past
injuries.”119
The court distinguished its decision in AA Suncoast Chiropractic
Clinic, P.A. v. Progressive American Insurance Co.,120 which held that a
claim seeking an injunction “restoring” insurance coverage limits
should not have been certified for class treatment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(2) because the requested relief was “not an
injunction at all.”121 “Here, unlike in AA Suncoast, our inquiry is
unrelated to whether Mack is entitled to the declaratory relief he
seeks . . . . The issue before us now is whether Mack has alleged the
type of harm necessary to establish his standing to bring declaratory
judgment claims.”122 Citing the principle that “all doubts about
jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court,”—a
doctrine open to question, at least in CAFA cases, under Dart Cherokee
Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,123—the court remanded the case with
instructions that the unsettled claims be sent back to state court.124
III. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND CLASS ACTION
WAIVERS
A. Arbitration Agreement Defeating Class Action: Hearn v. Comcast
A Comcast arbitration agreement by which a former subscriber to the
cable service agreed to arbitrate “any claim or controversy related to
Comcast” was enforced by the court in Hearn v. Comcast Cable
Communications, LLC,125 overturning a contrary decision by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.126 The
arbitration agreement was included in Comcast’s subscriber agreement
with the plaintiff, but the plaintiff terminated his service. A year and a
half later, however, the plaintiff approached Comcast about renewing
service.127 In connection with that inquiry, Comcast made use of his

119. Id. at 1358.
120. 938 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2019).
121. Id. at 1175.
122. Mack, 994 F.3d at 1358.
123. 574 U.S. 81 (2014).
124. Mack, 994 F.3d at 1359 (quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d
405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999)).
125. 992 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2021). The court’s opinion was authored by Judge
Charles Wilson.
126. Id. at 1211.
127. Id.
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credit report, which he claimed violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA),128 in a subsequent putative class action.129
The Eleventh Circuit began by noting that the court had previously
held that an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)130 can reach beyond matters addressed in the underlying
contract.131 But the court noted that the standard arbitration
agreement typically covers disputes relating to the underlying
contract.132 The court deemed a “close question” to be presented by
Comcast’s broad arbitration provision, but decided to leave it for
another day.133 Instead, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s FCRA
claim related to his subscriber agreement, for several reasons.134 First,
Comcast was able to conduct a credit check only because of the
plaintiff’s previous relationship with Comcast. Second, the subscriber
agreement included provisions dealing specifically with credit inquiries
and reconnection. The plaintiff argued that he was not calling to
reconnect services, because he had previously terminated them.135 But
the court concluded that the contract’s reconnection provision was
broad enough to cover that eventuality and not just suspensions of
service for delinquencies or failures in payment.136 The court also noted
that Comcast’s use of the information that it had on file concerning the
plaintiff was foreseeable, and that the agreement’s credit inquiries
provision directly related to his FCRA claim.137 Interestingly, the scope
of the arbitration agreement could have been committed by the
agreement to the arbitrators, with an express delegation, but
apparently was not, leaving the courts to decide scope questions.
Although the court remanded for a determination of other antiarbitration arguments, including unconscionability, it does not appear
that any of these issues were litigated in the district court.138 After
remand, the case had little activity for several months, until the district

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2021).
Hearn, 992 F.3d at 1211–12.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2021).
Hearn, 992 F.3d at 1213.
Id.
Id. at 1214.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1214–15.
Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.

2022

CLASS ACTIONS

1149

court entered a short order granting the motion to compel individual
arbitration “pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals.”139
B. Class-Action Waivers and Mass Actions: McIntosh v. Royal
Caribbean and Roman v. Spirit Airlines
The Eleventh Circuit dealt with another type of contractual classaction avoidance mechanism in two cases, McIntosh v. Royal Caribbean
Cruises, Ltd.140 and Roman v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.141 Both cases involved
class-action waivers contained in passengers’ ticket contracts; the
passengers’ attempts to circumvent these waivers by bringing a mass
action; and the issue of whether the mass action could meet the amount
in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction.
In McIntosh, the plaintiff was a would-be cruise passenger who
brought a putative class action against the cruise line seeking damages
arising from the last-minute cancellation of a cruise because of a
hurricane.142 After the district court ruled that the case could not
proceed as a class action due to a class-action waiver in the cruise ticket
contracts, the plaintiff and more than 100 other passengers filed a joint
amended complaint bringing individual claims. The district court,
however, dismissed the amended complaint, in part because of its sua
sponte finding that the amended complaint did not plead damages
sufficient under 28 U.S.C. § 1332143 to meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement.144
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.145 As to the amount in
controversy, the court concluded that the district court erred both
procedurally and substantively.146 Procedurally, while it was proper for
the court to take up the issue of its jurisdiction sua sponte, the court
erred by not giving the parties “notice and an opportunity to be heard”
on the issue before ruling.147
As to the substance of that ruling, although the district court may
have been correct in ruling that the individual plaintiffs’ damages could
not be aggregated, it should have gone on to “consider whether any

139. Order, Hearn v. Comcast Cable Comm’ns, LLC, No. 1:19-CV-01198-TWT (N.D.
Ga. Jan 19, 2022).
140. 5 F.4th 1309 (11th Cir. 2021).
141. No. 20–13699, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 28847 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2021).
142. McIntosh, 5 F.4th at 1311.
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011).
144. McIntosh, 5 F.4th at 1311.
145. Id. at 1315.
146. Id. at 1311–12.
147. Id. at 1312.
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individual plaintiff had satisfied the $75,000 amount-in-controversy
requirement.”148 The Eleventh Circuit cited Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services,149 in which the Supreme Court held that
[W]here the other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least
one named plaintiff in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy
requirement, . . . [a court may exercise] . . . supplemental jurisdiction
over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same Article III case or
controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional
amount specified in the statute setting forth the requirements for
diversity jurisdiction.150

Because the complaint did not plead a specific amount of damages,
the plaintiffs had “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the claim on which jurisdiction is based exceeds the
jurisdictional minimum.”151 But the district court never gave the
plaintiffs the opportunity to do so.152 The Eleventh Circuit, however, on
review of the record, was “convinced that at least some of the plaintiffs
sufficiently pled damages over $75,000,” and could meet the amount in
controversy requirement.153 The court noted, however, that there were
questions about whether complete diversity existed, which the district
court would need to explore on remand.154 The Eleventh Circuit also
chided the district court for dismissing the complaint with prejudice,
noting, “[i]f subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, dismissal must be
without prejudice.”155
The defendant had better luck in Roman, a putative class action
challenging a $6 fee charged by Spirit Airlines for an allegedly bogus
“Shortcut Security” service.156 The plaintiff passengers brought various
state-law claims and invoked diversity jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA),157 because they sued on behalf of more
than 100 class members with combined claims exceeding $5 million.158
The airline then moved to dismiss the action based on a class-action
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545 U.S. 546 (2005).
Id. at 549.
McIntosh, 5 F.4th at 1312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1313.
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Roman, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 28847, at *1.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011).
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waiver contained in the contract of carriage that each passenger signed
while booking his flights. Moreover, the airline argued, no plaintiff’s
individual claim based on the $6 fee could meet the $75,000 amount in
controversy for traditional diversity jurisdiction. The district court
agreed and dismissed the case.159
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that
their claims did not fall within the class-action waiver.160 The waiver in
the contract of carriage read as follows: “No Class Action – Any case
brought pursuant to this Contract of Carriage, Spirit’s Tarmac Delay
Plan, or Spirit’s Guest Service Plan must be brought in a party’s
individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any
purported class or representative proceeding.”161 Because the “Shortcut
Security” service was listed as an “optional service” on the airline’s
website, and the contract of carriage discussed the purchase of optional
services, “the plaintiffs’ claims concerning that service were all brought
pursuant to the contract of carriage[,]” and therefore, “fell within the
scope of the class-action waiver” and had to be brought individually.162
With no individual claim exceeding $75,000, the plaintiffs would have
to proceed, if at all, in state court.
IV. CAFA JURISDICTION
Can class-action plaintiffs avoid federal court by relying on general
economic studies and population statistics to prove that their case
should be in state court? Not in the Eleventh Circuit. In Smith v.
Marcus & Millichap, Inc.,163 the court held that “studies, surveys, and
census data—which do not directly involve the plaintiffs”—are not
“sufficient to establish that a certain percentage of the plaintiff class
are citizens of a particular state for the purposes of CAFA’s local
controversy and discretionary exceptions.”164
CAFA provides for federal court jurisdiction over class actions
involving more than $5 million as long as the parties are minimally
diverse—that is, at least one plaintiff resides and intends to remain in a
different state than at least one defendant.165 This grant, however, is
subject to two exceptions: CAFA requires federal district courts to
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
court.
164.
165.

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5–6.
991 F.3d 1145 (11th Cir. 2021). Judge Lisa Branch authored the opinion for the
Id. at *2–3.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
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decline to exercise jurisdiction over certain cases in which more than
two-thirds of the proposed class are citizens of the state where the case
was filed (the “local-controversy” exception);166 and permits district
courts to decline jurisdiction over certain cases in which more than onethird of the proposed class are citizens of that state (the “discretionary”
exception).167
The Smith plaintiffs were past and present residents of skillednursing facilities marketed and sold in Florida by an out-of-state
defendant.168 After the defendants removed the case to federal court
under CAFA, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand to state court
under the statute’s local-controversy and discretionary exceptions. And
in an effort to carry their burden of proving that one- or two-thirds of
the proposed class were Florida citizens, the plaintiffs presented federal
census data, economic studies, and population surveys, which—
according to the district court—showed that residents of nursing
facilities typically “hale from the proximate area” and that senior
citizens do not often move out of state.169 Having found that the
plaintiffs had “shown by a preponderance of the evidence that twothirds of the class members are citizens of Florida,” the district court
remanded the case to state court under CAFA’s local-controversy
exception.170
The Eleventh Circuit reversed.171 The plaintiffs had not limited their
proposed class to Florida citizens, and without such a limitation, the
court held, “generalized evidence cannot be the sole basis of the
citizenship determination.”172 The court thus rejected the plaintiffs’
emphasis on “common sense” and supposedly “logical inferences,” and
instead cited reasoning from the Ninth Circuit: “[T]here must ordinarily
be at least some specific facts in evidence from which the district court
may make findings regarding class members’ citizenship for purposes of
CAFA’s local controversy exception.”173 As the Eleventh Circuit held,
“[w]e cannot rely only on a series of purportedly reasonable inferences

166. Id. at (d)(4).
167. Id. at (d)(3).
168. Smith, 991 F.3d at 1148.
169. Id. at 1154.
170. Id. at 1154–55.
171. Id. at 1162–63.
172. Id. at 1157.
173. Id. at 1157–58 (quoting Mondragon v. Capitol One Auto. Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 884
(9th Cir. 2013)).
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to determine citizenship; we cannot base our determination of
citizenship on ‘sensible guesswork.’”174
Although the court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments about class
citizenship, it also rejected one of the defendant’s arguments that he
could not afford to pay a judgment and was therefore not a “significant”
defendant for purposes of the local-controversy exception—which is
further limited to actions in which the plaintiff seeks “significant relief”
from an in-state defendant.175 The court thus held that “CAFA does not
require the district court to examine a defendant’s ability to pay based
on the unambiguous plain meaning of the statute’s text.”176
Finally, in addressing CAFA’s discretionary exception—which is
further limited to cases in which “the primary defendants are citizens of
the State in which the action was originally filed”177—the court
concluded that the plaintiffs’ assertion of significant claims against an
out-of-state defendant “destroys plaintiffs’ ability to invoke the
discretionary exception.”178
Smith shows that courts in the Eleventh Circuit will not allow
plaintiffs to avoid CAFA jurisdiction by relying on mere assumptions
about class citizenship: “[w]hile we do not hold that a district court may
never consider evidence of a general nature in determining citizenship
of the class, such generalized evidence cannot be the sole basis of the
citizenship determination.”179 On the contrary, class-action plaintiffs
are more likely to satisfy CAFA’s citizenship-based exceptions by citing
at least some “evidence relating directly to the putative class, such as
declarations of class members’ intent to remain in Florida, property
records, or tax records.”180
V. ENGLE PROGENY
In what may be one of the last Engle progeny cases181 to reach the
Eleventh Circuit, the court again upheld an award of punitive damages
against the tobacco company defendant, rejecting Phillip Morris’s
argument that the award—which was over three times the amount of
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Id. at 1158 (quoting In re Sprint, 593 F.3d 669, 674 (7th Cir. 2010)).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa).
Smith, 991 F.3d at 1161.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3).
Smith, 991 F.3d at 1162.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1148.
Byrne & Mohr, supra note 1.
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compensatory damages awarded to the individual plaintiff—was
unconstitutionally excessive in violation of due process.182
The latest decision, in Cote v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc. (Cote II),
comes more than six years after a jury awarded the individual plaintiff
$6.25 million in compensatory damages and $20.7 million in punitive
damages—and more than two years after the Eleventh Circuit’s first
decision to reinstate the punitive damages award.183 In that opinion,
the court reversed the district court’s grant of Phillip Morris’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law on the two intentional-tort claims and
accordingly remanded “the case to the district court for the entry of
judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on [the intentional tort] claims . . . and for
reinstatement of the jury’s corresponding punitive damages award.”184
On remand, the district court did just that, amending the judgment
to include the jury’s $20.7 million punitive damages award.185 Phillip
Morris, however, filed three motions contesting the judgment, one of
which argued that the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally
excessive in violation of due process. The district court denied the
motion, and Phillip Morris appealed.186
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,187 analyzing the award under the
three “guideposts” set out by the Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.188 Each of these guideposts—the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; the ratio of punitive
damages to actual harm suffered; and the civil penalties authorized in
comparable cases—indicated that the award was not unconstitutionally
excessive.189
Phillip Morris’s appellate arguments focused primarily on the second
guidepost, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.190 Although
the 3-to-1 ratio at issue was less than the “quadruple damages” ratio
that State Farm noted “might be close to the line of constitutional

182. Cote v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 985 F.3d 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2021) (hereinafter
Cote II).
183. Id. at 843–44.
184. Id. at 845 (quoting Cote v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 909 F.3d 1094, 1110 (11th
Cir. 2018) (hereinafter Cote I)); see also Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey McGavin Mohr, Class
Actions, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 70 MERCER L. REV. 895 (2018).
185. Cote II, 985 F.3d at 843.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
189. Cote II, 985 F.3d at 847.
190. Id. at 848.
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impropriety,” Phillip Morris argued that it nevertheless was excessive
for two reasons, both of which the court rejected.191
First, the court dismissed, as based on dicta, Phillip Morris’s
argument that a “substantial” compensatory damages award warrants
“a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages.”192 Not
only is this language from State Farm dicta, but it also is followed
immediately by the caution that each case “must be based upon the
facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the
plaintiff.”193 The court therefore declined to impose a “bright-line” rule
“requiring a 1-to-1 ratio whenever a defendant asserts that the
compensatory damages are ‘substantial.’”194
Second, the court rejected Phillip Morris’s comparisons of the award
here to those in other Engle-progeny cases.195 Previous cases finding
awards with 3-to-1 ratios excessive were not determinative because,
among other differences, those cases were against R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., not Phillip Morris.196 Conversely, the court refused to
impose a ceiling based on the 2-to-1 ratio197 recently affirmed by the
Eleventh Circuit in Kerrivan v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.198 As the
court explained, “[w]e are aware of no reason why two decisions in other
Engle-progeny cases (there are thousands) as to the excessiveness of
punitive damages in those cases should govern here.”199
Although the affirmance of yet another Engle-progeny verdict may
not seem remarkable, two footnotes in Cote II offer some interesting
insight into the progress of these cases. In footnote 2, the court noted
the district court’s statement that Phillip Morris’s filing of post-trial
motions “served no other purpose than to delay payment of the
judgment,” and may warrant remedial sanctions.200 Although the court
declined to issue sanctions, it did “agree with the District Court’s
admonition that further delay is not acceptable.”201 Later in the opinion,
the court also clarified that its opinion in Cote I did not preclude Phillip
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Morris’s constitutional challenge to the punitive damages award,
because that issue was not before the court in that appeal.202
And, in footnote 5, the court discussed Phillip Morris’s arguments on
the impact of the punitive damages awards in the Engle-progeny cases
taken together, regardless of the guideposts’ application in individual
cases.203 First, further “punitive damages are not necessary for
deterrence or punishment.”204 Second, “any punitive damages award
must be low enough such that the aggregate amount of punitive
damages in all Engle litigation is not unconstitutionally excessive.”205
Conceding that these arguments were rejected and therefore foreclosed
by Kerrivan, Phillip Morris nevertheless maintained them to “preserve
its position for potential further review,” presumably en banc or before
the Supreme Court.206
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